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1« In a free enterprise system, private or for that matter public,^ 
adequately regulated by the market mechanism, sufficiently responsive to 
indirect controls, and on the whole "doing well", there is no need for 
supervisory authorities to gauge the high- from the low-performers, to look 
at the inner functioning of individual enterprises, or even to relate to 
them as individual enterprises. The individual enterprise could be and should 
be perceived as a "black box", However, this may be a feasible posture for 
2/ 
supervising authorities where no serious performance shortfall obtains»-' 
As supervising authorities in developing countries confront situations of 
performance shortfalls among government operated enterprises, they are impelled, 
irrespective of their preferred style of supervision, to make direct 
interventions designed to bring forth corrective action. 
2. A performance shortfall, being a difference between the actual and the 
attainable expected or targeted performance results in a given situation, is 
both a scourge and a promise to a public enterprise system. More important 
than the shortfall is the "notion" toward the attainable. Whether or not a 
public enterprise or a population of public enterprises is moving toward 
higher performance standard is the problem to be reckoned with. The task 
for supervisory authorities is to induce, facilitate and accelerate this 
movement. It involves a three-pronged attack on the problem of performance 
short-fall. First, high-performers have to be identified, reinforced, 
consolidated and rewarded. Second, low-performers have to be closely looked 
at. The incorrigible cases would have to be singled out for special treatment. 
The rest with a potential for performance improvement are more amenable to 
corrective interventions. Third, the over-all performance of the public 
enterprise system i.e. the aggregated performance results of.a given population 
of public enterprises would have to be continuously improved. These tasks 
1/ Note, for example, the Yugoslav model as it simulates, under public 
ownership, the organizational model of a free enterprise economy. 
2/ In situations of a serious performance shortfall, like the depression 
of the 1930's, supervising authorities in many developed countries 
intervened to take over failing enterprises. 
/constitute what 
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constitute what may be designated, as the performance-improvement function. 
The higher the credibility of a performance shortfall, as available records 
suggest, the greater the magnitude of this function» .At the base of such a 
function is the analytical capability of assessing and. diagnosing the 
performance of a given population.of public enterprise, and, in turn, 
devising corrective interventions, Short of such an analytical capability, 
supervising authorities may well be in a position to "coerce" management 
action, exert pressure on operating management, ordain, but not necessarily 
influence the performance of a growing population of public enterprises. 
A .Methodological Mote 
3» This paper sets out to explore what foes into this analytical capability 
with a view to provide a working understanding of the forces bearing on 
public enterprise performance in developing countries. It reports on the 
main findings of a research project undertaking by the.Public Administration 
Division based on a cross-section of comparative cases.^ Available evidence 
recurrently points to the availability of cases of visibly "successful" public 
enterprises operating, side by side with less successful ones in the same 
national environment. In any one country covered in the field research 
evident cases of success and of dismal failure were ever-present and such 
contrasting cases have proved to be readily identifiable. The striking 
paradox in some countries covered by field research is the frequency of 
incidents - duly embroidered - of public enterprise failures in association 
with evident cases of success, and, at time of "heroic" performance against 
exceptional odds. This is deemed to provide a unique opportunity for 
comparative performance case studies. These were designed to search for the 
forces accounting for this differential performance in the same national 
environment. Broadly stated, the problem to be explored is what makes for 
such differential performance in a particular environment and in reference to 
specific, concrete and live cases. The focus is on intra-country rather 
than on inter-countries comparison« In any particular situation and given 
cases representing significant performance differential, the question is: 
What forces within a particular situation appear to account for this 
differential performance? 
2/ For a more extensive treatment see the draft report on "Measures For 
Improving Performance of Public Enterprise in Developing'Countries", 
submitted as the main document for discussion in the U.N. Expert 
Working Group convened in Herceg-Novi-Yugpslavia, 13-24 October 1969. 
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4« Analysis of performance differentials in particular situations 
necessarily eliminates, in large measure, the total system effects and bring 
into sharper focus differences in enterprise management responses to a 
particular situation. What patterns of responses seem to correlate with 
success or to correlate with failure - is essentially the question posed 
by this analysis. For many observers of public enterprise performance, 
struck by the contrasting cases of high and low performance in the same 
country situation, would be inclined to underscore the forces.operating 
within the enterprise boundaries more than the forces without. Debating the 
relative importance of these two sets of forces would be less than useful. 
For the two sets of forces necessarily interlock and are only conceptually 
separable, 
5« It has proved particularly instructive to look at the visible 
contratable cases standing at the extreme ends of the spectrum than the 
doubtful bulk in between. On one end, there are oft-repeated cases, perhaps 
more demoralizing than cases of obvious failures from the start of enterprises 
that, after a hopeful start, have stagnated and deteriorated. Case examples 
of such "performance deterioration" are always at hand: the Port Authority 
which has been downgraded because of chronic indigestion which creeped in as 
development proceeded; the continuous process pasteurization plant which 
resorted to intermittant production on account of milk procurement difficulties; 
the first-class hotel that shortly after a triumphal opening'has become third 
rate on account of poor service and mediocre maintenance; the "supermarket" 
which slowly takes on again the familiar features of the much decried open-
air market place. Such cases of performance deterioration are more indicative 
of the pathology of public enterprises than cases of uncertain health or 
"normal" functioning, On the other end, there are cases of successful, if not 
outstanding, performance which have significance out of proportion to their 
number. In a way, this observable differential points to the potential for 
performance improvement in the public enterprise sector; perhaps more so than 
inter-country differentials, 
6, The most handy tool for analyzing this observable performance differential 
is the comparative case study technique. Comparative cases of high and low 
performance provide experience-based insights into what makes for effective 
/performance in 
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performance in a "given situation". One tool of analysis that has proved 
particularly useful and powerful in identifying, interrelating and assessing 
the forces bearing on public enterprise performance is the well-known 
diagnostic technique of force-field analysis. According to this technique, 
the performance of any individual public enterprise, or for that matter the 
total public enterprise sector - the technique being applicable at a micro 
and a macro-level - is taken as a function of a set of impelling forces, 
conducing to better performance, and of.an opposite set of impeding forces 
which are inhibiting better performance. Through time, the change in the 
level of performance is a function of upsetting the equilibrium between 
these two sets of opposing forces. A simple graphical representation of 
this diagnostic technique is presented in Exhibit I below. The actual 
Exhibit I 
A SCHEMATIC PRESENTATION OF FORCE-FIELD ANALYSIS 
Desired or Attainable Level of Performance ¿1 J impeding forces 
* A c t u a l L e v e l ^ Performance , ̂ ^ forces 
level of performance, for any individual public enterprise or for the 
public enterprise sector as a, whole, is likely to remain stationary so long 
as the two sets of impelling and impeding forces are in balance. 
7. As the impeding forces gain in relative strength. over the impelling 
forcer— the performance level is likely to deteriorate» This diagnostic 
framework has been found helpful in searching for a valid interpretation 
of the cases of performance deterioration, and. for contrasting them with 
cases of improving performance. The technique, however, does not provide, the 
substantive interpretation. But it does help the analyst in identifying 
and evaluating the forces operating on public enterprise performance in any 
case. It is particularly helpful in diagnosing complex perforaiance problems. 




and for that matter the performance of a total public enterprise sector, 
presents a highly complex problem. The availability of a high-powered, 
yet rather simple technique such a force-field-analysis, proved valuable 
in basing reform prescriptions on adequate diagnosis, 
8» The force-field-analysis, as briefly described above, was built into 
the design for undertaking twenty comparative case studies of performance, 
covering ten cases of high performance and ten cases of low performance. 
The countries covered included Ceylon, Colombia, Ghana, India, Kenya., Morocco, 
Pakistan, Turkey, Uganda and U.A.R. From each country two cases were drawn: 
one high and one low,^ A more intensive application of.this analysis has 
been undertaken in workshop settings in Ceylon and the U.A.R, The workshops 
involved no less than 250 public enterprise managers and senior staff from 
their supervising ministries. An instrument of programming for performance-
improvement in public enterprises, developed around the conceptual framework 
of force field analysis was used to get at the performance problems of 
114 public enterprises.-̂  An interview schedule based on the same schema served 
to elicit more information through individual otructured interviews with a 
cross-section of Afro-Asian public enterprise managers and senior administrators. 
More than 300 interviews were conducted in-Algeria., Ceylon, Cyprus, Ghana, 
Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, india and the U.A.R, The field information was 
supplemented further by interviews in depth with 35 management consultant and 
experts who have had adequate exposure to and intimate involvement in public 
enterprises in developing countries. A content analysis of field missions 
and advisers1 reports touching on public enterprise performance in developing 
countries has also generated some useful insights, 
9. From all this evidence, the problems of performance in public enterprises 
of developing countries can be glimpsed with some certainty. It would be 
difficult to judge how representative is the experience captured and it would be 
For a more detailed description of the methodology see: "A Gin de for the 
Comparative Case Studies of Public Enterprise Performance in Selected 
Countries", A memorandum issued by the Public.Administrâtion Division, 
November 1967. 
J5/ The instrument used in Ceylon is presented in Appendix II of "Report On 
Pérformance-Improvémént in the State Corporations of Ceylon", by 
A, Fouad Sherif, U.N, Public Administration Division, November 1968, 
/rash to 
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rash to claim that it is fully descriptive of the experience of a particular 
country or a particular enterprise. The only certainties are the 
individuality and uniqueness of the public enterprises observed and the 
diversity of problems they experience. These are so certain inferences that, 
they ought to defeat any quest for uniform, simple and generalized solutions. 
Each enterprise observed represents a unique constellation of impeding and 
impelling forces, operating on its performance in particular ways. It is a 
task, and a difficult one at that, for supervising authorities to discover 
this unique constellation.of forces pertaining to an individual enterprise 
in a particular situation. There could be situations, frequent as they 
seem, which call upon superior authorities to make this kind of discovery. 
At the present stage of knowledge about public enterprise performance, it 
is perhaps more fruitful to grope for better diagnostic tools than for a 
general theory. The empirical findings to date are still too limited to 
test with any finality an adequate number of propositions. Nor do they lend 
themselves to any considered quantification. Nor can they be generalized 
to all public enterprises in all situations. However, they do provide the 
diagnosticians of public enterprise performance with more clues than can 
usually be inferred from a few case studies. Yet it would be erroneous to 
expect from this kind of diagnostic research a standard interpretation for 
public enterprise performance that would pertain to all cases. The best 
can be reaped from this kind of research is to be in a position to point out 
suggestively rather than definitively, "problem areas" that the diagnostician 
should look for - subject to further empirical verification in every case. 
General findings 
10. The findings point, indeed, to an enormous multiplicity of impeding 
forces - reducing or restraining the improvement in public enterprise 
performance. In general, the impeding forces perceived overbalance and 
outweight the impelling forces. In cases of low performance in particular, 
the impeding forces figure as overwhelming while the impelling forces are 
fewer and inadequate. The responses of the operating managers suggest a 
greater multiplicity of impeding forces than those perceived by superior 
agencies' personnel, removed from operational responsibilities. But the 




restraining forces in a variety of situations. Checking these perceptions 
by independent observations seems also to confirm this general picture. The 
sheer number, of course, of forces operating on both sides is not an accurate 
index of the observable imbalance that obtains in most cases. The strength of 
each of them will, of course, vary from instance to instance, and as perceived 
by different participants» With due adjustments in the number of forces by 
their relative strengths, the general picture remains the same. 
11. These forces, classifiable as they are in a variety of ways, are subject 
to varying emphases from the different parties concerned. Forces within the 
enterprise and problems of internal management are more emphasized in the 
perceptions of consultants than in the responses of operating managers. The 
tendency on the part of the latter to project their problems on the external 
environment is quite understandable. A corresponding tendency has been 
observed among superior agencies personnel, to project the deficiencies and 
the ¡short-fall on the operating manager on the firing line. Checking these 
mutual perceptions against each other has proved revealing of the patterns. 
of organizational relations between the enterprises and superior agencies, 
as will be subsequently discussed. Striking, however, is the fact that in 
the perceptions of the three different groups there is an implicit agreement 
on the paucity of impelling forces - operating to drive the performance of 
public enterprises. Forces operating in this direction have been less 
frequently mentioned in all.the responses and were found more difficult to 
spell out and to articulate, 
12, Aside from the conventional practices of tariff protection and 
subsidization - which might be questionable as impelling forces from a sound 
growth viewpoint - positive forces favouring the improvement of public 
enterprise performance were found generally lacking or inadequate. It was 
found useful, in exploring the responses pointing to the need for help designed 
to improve the performance of public enterprises, to make the distinction 
between growth-oriented measures of help and artificial or restrictive measures. 
The former point to measures aimed at augmenting and widening the choices 
available to enterprise managers, inducing improvement in their capabilities 
rather than fostering their dependence upon the help-giving agency. It is 





are lacking or inadequate. In a real sense, it was found that the largest 
segment of the population of public enterprises observed, except for cases 
where public enterprises emerged through nationalization of established foreign 
enterprises and where an element of continuity is still.present, represents 
infant enterprises operating in a difficult environment. This renders the 
public enterprise manager's job more difficult than that of perhaps his 
counterpart in the private sector and definitely more than that of his 
counterpart in a developed country,-̂  But this should not serve the purpose 
of public enterprise apologetics inasmuch as it should make for an adequate 
appreciation of the operating manager's problem and his need for help in 
relating to supervising authorities. Such help has to be geared to inducing 
organizational development and enhancing the capability of operating 
management to cope with its problems, 
13, The perceptions of the different groups seem to suggest a good measure 
of awareness that the key impelling force in the performance of public 
enterprises relates to the competence and motivation of the top-management 
of public enterprises. With the growing vertical diffusion of top-management 
authorities under central development planning and a hierarchy of supervision, 
it has become difficult to define the top-management structure in public 
enterprises exclusively in terms corresponding to the private corporate 
structure. Even where the same nomenclature is in vogue, the connations 
might be significantly different. The management board, the top senior 
executive and those who direcly report to him carry different roles in 
different institutional settings. Furthermore they are a part of a higher 
hierarchy that extends to supervising authorities. However, the field evidence 
indicates that a key role is taken up by the operating management at the 
enterprise level even in the most centralized system of management of public 
enterprises, and under the closest supervision. On the strength of available 
field evidence, the strategic role of operating management, at the individual 
enterprise level, need not be overemphasized - except for the inherent 
tendency under centrally managed systems to devalue the role of operating 
6/ For a similar observation see United Nations Economic and Social Council 
Report N° E/3901, Training of National Technical Personnel for -
Accelerated Industrialization of Developing Countries, Part I, Add, 1, 
page 85, 
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managers in favour of overestimating the contribution of central planners 
and superior agencies personnel. There is evidence in Several countries 
covered by the field work that the job of the public enterprise manager is 
valued as less glamorous and less prestigious than that of a member of the 
central planning conmission or the senior personnel in supervisory and 
control agencies.^ The evidence suggests further that the prevailing 
systems of managing public enterprises are quite insensitive to the issues, 
dilemmas, anxieties and difficulties experienced by operating managers. 
This problem area is deemed to merit further investigation, 
Ik. According to the schema of force field analysis, the strategies of 
change designed to effect improvement in public enterprise performance are 
broadly: (a) to remove or reduce the impeding forces; (b) to add to or 
strengthen the impelling forces; (c) to combine both (a) and (b); (d) to 
focus on the strategic force - whether impelling or improving. The complexity 
of the forces operating on public enterprise performance seems to suggest 
that an integrated or a multiple prongs strategy - manipulating simultaneously 
a multiplicity of impeding and impelling forces - is called for in most 
situations. The following paragraphs will probe further these forces -
winding up with a preliminary examination of strategies for performance-
improvement in public enterprises. 
Assessing performance-improvement -potential 
15, No enterprise observed seems to lack a performance-improvement potential, 
and a significant one at that. This.is largely validated by the ILO 
experience in the productivity field. The attainable level of performance, 
by and large, outdistances the actual level. Some sense of the attainable 
can be obtained from the performance gap between the high and the low-
performers in a particular situation. In terms of any appropriate performance 
criterion, be it production expansion, fuller capacity utilization, cost 
reduction, savings on import requirements, larger export proceeds and the 
like, the attainable is way above the actual, leaving a significant potential 
for performance-improvement. 
7/ For example, a typical statement indicative of the attitude prevailing 
in central planning authorities is that "the problems posed by 
implementation are far less glamorous than those of devising and 
manipulating sophisticated programming models". See H.C, Rieger, 




ló. àmpief though spotty, evidence of the magnitude of this potential, 
can.be gleaned from several pointers and indicators. Ifeny technical 
assitance reports touching on the performance of individual public enterprises 
bring out that significant potential. Oné such report ori a Plywoods 
Corporation in Ceylon has estimated the possibility of doubling production 
out of existing capacities through the introduction of minor improvements 
in the processes of production and transportation. Another on a steel plant 
in the middle east estimated the possibility of 40 per cent cost reduction 
per ton through no major changes or extra investment; Innumerable ILO field 
reports would point to similar possibilities. Based on technological • 
possibilities and forecasting such projections might tend, however, to 
overestimate the potential. For the managerial capability for effecting 
such technically feasible improvements might remain unaccounted for. And 
technical experts might tend to exaggerate what is technically possible. 
17. A more significant clue, therefore, to this potential is to be found 
in the perceptions of operating managers. The responses of operating managers 
in several situations have frequently testified to the availability of a 
significant potential for performance-improvement. The high performers might 
tend to overestimate that potential and underestimate the difficulties 
involved in tapping it. In cases of low performance or deterioration, the 
perceptions of the operating managers invplved were expressive of impeding 
forces overwhelmingly overbalancing impelling forces, if any. The potential 
for performance-improvement is seen very small and/or the difficulties 
involved in tapping it are often overestimated* A sense of impotence and 
loss of control could only inhibit any expendable effort at performance-
improvement. Not only high performers seem to be moving in terms of present 
performance compared with the recent part, but also they are more open to 
and optimistic about further performance improvement. For, in essence, the 
process is one of moving toward a moving attainable level of performance. 
18. The high performers in any population of public enterprises serve as 
a pointer to some attainable potential. The gap between the leaders and 
the laggards in the same national environment provide a global indicator 
of that potential and an example of what can be done. Their visibility is 
an obvious precondition of any demonstration effect. But the high performers 
, /are not 
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are not always visible even to their supervising authorities, particularly 
in situations of proliferation, and especially for the less spectacular 
projects. This might be gleaned from the lack of a consensus or a near-
consensus in many situations among supervising agencies personnel on rating 
the highest three performers from among their subordinate enterprises. And 
this lack of visibility can be often demoralizing to the operating men 
involved. 
19. Identifying the high-performers which almost invariably are found in 
every situation is an initial, yet crucial step in programming for performance 
improvement. Thus, in surveying the performance of the State Corporations in 
Ceylon, the State Engineering Corporation, the Ceylon Tyre Corporation and 
the River Valley Development Board (R.V.D.B.), among few more, stood in 
relation to the rest as forerunners of improved practices. Identifying the 
high-performers and enhancing their visibility calls for a.certain 
8/ 
"symbolic capability"- on the part of superior authorities. It calls for 
the judicious creation of powerful and meaningful symbols and the selective 
transmission of symbolic messages that could have adequate resonance, yet 
entail little cost. These symbolic rewards, effectively administered, could 
have an impact out of proportion to the cost and effort involved. The Indian 
administrative practice seems to have adequately recognized this capability, 
Hindustan Insecticides ltd., a high performer covered in the cross-section 
of comparative cases, appears to have been, awarded twice the "Presidential 
Certificate of Honour" for good ever-all performance, and to have received a 
prized from Delhi Productivity Council, in the Indian Productivity year, 
for its production and cost reduction results. For all their predilection 
for producing symbols in all spheres, many governments observed do not seem to 
adequately practice this symbolic capability in reference to performance-
improvement in the public enterprise ̂sector. Such practices seem to have 
been intensively used in so-called centrally-planned economics, particularly 
those emplasizing non-material incentives. By and large, however, the high 
performers in the cases covered do not seem to be sufficiently identified; 
nor symbolically rewarded and reinforced, 
8/ A term used by G.A. Almond and G.B. Powell, in their book Comparative 
Policies, Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1966, pages 199-201.. 
/20. Several 
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20, Several other indicators can roughly point to the potential for 
performance-improvement in the public enterprise sector, looked at as a 
whole. The unutilized capacities, large as already seenj the capital-
output ratios as compared with what obtains in other situations; enter-firm 
performance comparisons involving similar public enterprises abroad; 
measuring the lag behind modern practice and so on, could provide some useful 
global indicators, But such global assessments could only affirm an a priori 
assumption which is almost always safe and useful to make, namely, that' the 
potential is there and is significant at that. Exaggerated anticipations, 
of course, might only lead to psychological failure and might inhibit further 
any achievement motivation. But reasonable anticipations and realistic 
performance-improvement goals, which are to be subsequently checked against 
more concrete results, are, more often than not, realizeahle. And it is 
more useful to err on the positive side than to underrate or gloss over such 
potential. In fact, the quest for performance-improvement is bound to be more 
reinforced by reasonably overestimating this potential and reasonably 
underestimating the foreseeable and unforeseeable difficulties involved in 
tapping it than by making the reverse error as could be the case, 
21, The tendency to err on the negative side could be found in situations 
whence public enterprise operate in a highly hostile climate of opinion. This 
is partly observable in Ceylon; post-1966 Ghana and several Latin American 
countries, A widespread notion that public enterprises are "inherently" 
ineffective - a belief which is xiAderstandably held and propagated by 
advocates of private enterprise and several vested interests - might pervade the 
climate of informed opihion and penetrate the administration» This might be 
constantly fed and reinforced by a persistently negative image of the. 
performance of public enterprises continuously projected by the press. While 
these press reports mirror the reality, they are not infrequently slanted, 
distorted and partial. Deficient performance is often being magnified 
while achievements - and real achievements are never totally absent - are 
not adequately, if at all, publicized. Cases of reasonably successful 
performance do not makes news the way cases of dismal failure do. This 
should not suggest protecting low performance from public criticism, for 
this is not a growth - inducing help, as described above. Even in 
/centrally-planned 
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centrally-planned economies, committed ideologically to public enterprise, 
the leaderships have been readily permissive of public criticism being 
directed at the operating levels. In any event> suppressing such public 
criticise is never healthy if ever feasible* It could conduce to lethargic 
and lax performance. But the frequency with which operating managers , 
expressed their feeling of being enveloped by a hostile environment is not 
without serious implications for public enterprise performance. It points 
to a real problem area; to a public relations problem of the first order of 
magnitude in some situations; a problem that has to be squarely faced by 
operating managers and their superior authorities alike, 
22. Such a negative image, particularly in the absence of any conclusive 
information to the contrary as is often the case, could well influence the 
perceptions of supervising authorities in assessing the potential for 
performance-improvement. These perceptions might also be coloured by some 
lingering ambivalence flowing from the unresolved debate over public versus 
private enterprise, which has been observed in several situations. A 
strong commitment on the part of supervising authorities to a high level of 
economic performance in public enterprises might be interfered with by 
conflicting concerns. These continue to interfere with the sense of urgency 
for improving economic performance. Yet the public versus private enterprise 
debate is rationally beside the point when it comes to improving the 
performance of "on-going" or existing public enterprises. Indeed, in some 
situations, such improved performance could have facilitated their transfer 
to the private sector. Also one can validly argue that any worthy non-
economic goals are hardly viable or attainable in a low-performance economy. 
But the unresolved issues, the non-economic concerns and the lingering 
ambivalences, could still, in the face of the most rational arguments, • 
whittle down the commitment to and the urgency of effective action for 
performance improvement. 
23. Still the commitment might be forthcoming; yet the means might be 
inadequate. But this is the smaller part of the performance problem. For 
the global indicators of the potential for performance-improvement, assuring 
as they might be, do not yield an action programme - what is to be done, 





action steps at the operating-levels. Hence, supervising authorities have 
to get down to the operating levels and to devise the mechanisms of inducing 
and sustaining this" programming action. Any effective programming for 
performance improvement has to start from an adequate assessment of the 
capabilities profiles ̂  of individual enterprises and has to be coached in 
terms of a feasibility planning ̂  style. This is usually alien to and a 
far cry from the style of planning that crept into practice at the central 
levels. Not only a hew orientation to a different planning practice would 
be needed but also a new pattern of relationships has to be developed between 
the enterprise and its authority. For this kind of operational planning, in 
any effective sense, could only be highly participative, highly decentralized 
to mobilize the iniciative, motivation and commitment of the operating man 
"who know best how his shoe fits". 
Assessing Impeding Forces 
24« An exhaustive listing of all the impeding forces perceived by respondents 
and observed in the field would be less than useful. For - everything under the 
11/ sun, including the weather — ' could go into these forces. Yet each 
9/ The capability profile of an enterprise is a multi-purpose modern 
management technique which can be used to (a) evaluate any internal 
strengths and weaknesses, within the firm, (b) derive synergy 
charateristics which the enterprise can use in its search for 
opportunities, and (c) measure the synergy potential between the firm and 
possible acquisition. The synergy concept pertains to exploiting the 
possible interrelations among the components of a product line and the 
jointness of costs and assets to make the performance outcome greater 
than the simple summation of individual, parts; in effect, to make 2+-2=5. 
For a description of this technique, based on the practice of Lockheed 
Electronics Company see M. Igor Ansoff, Corporate Strategy, New York: 
McGraw-Hill 1965« 
10/ Feasibility planning is, in short, planning in terms of the capability 
profile of the enterprise; as described above; in terms of its comparative 
competence and what it can do best rather than in terms of central 
planners' preferences in abstraction from operating realities. It is 
planning from the operating levels up rather than from'the central levels 
down. For an approach to planning in the social field, using a similar 
concept, see Robert Morris and Robert H, Binstock, Feasible Planning for 
Social Change, New York: Columbia University Press, 1966, especially 
chapters I, II and VIII. 
11/ In fact, the performance of the Salt Corporation in Ceylon shows a direct 
and significant relation to weather conditions. For a renewed emphasis 
on weather conditions as, at least, a partial explanation of 
underdevelopment, see Gunnar Ifyrdal, "Asian Drama", New York 1968, 
/enterprise, as 
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enterprise, as noted represents a unique constellation thereof. Some 
regrouping and refinning of the raw data is unavoidable, even at.the risk 
of losing some of the flavour of the content originally captured. The ra.w 
data seems to lend itself to a six-fold Classification, as listed in Table 1 
below together with the percentages of frequencies or responses for each 
classification. No such classification, of course, is completely free from 
an element of arbitrariness and judgement. Many responses cut across more 
than one classification or can be classified in several ways. And their 
frecuencies are necessarily a rough indicator of the relative importance of. 
the varieties of impeding forces, operating on public enterprise performance,' 
Table 1 
CLASSIFICATION OF IMPEDING FORCES AND THEIR RELATIVE FREQUENCIES 
Category Frequency 
I. Forces Pertaining to Operating managers 23 
II. Forces Pertaining to Supervising Authorities 18 
III. Forces Pertaining to relationships between 
enterprise and supervising authorities 17 
IV. Forces Pertaining to initial structural handicaps 8 
v. Forces Pertaining to critical situational 
constraints 18 
VI. Forces Pertaining to systems characteristics 16 
100 
25» Forces pertaining to operating managers point particularly to: 
(1) deficient management motivation; (2) inadequacies in career background and 
professional orientation; (3) to the frequent role conflicts experienced by 
operating managers; (4) to their growing feeling that., they operate in a 
12/ The classification as it stands represents, however, a consensus of ten 
experts, obtained by using a simple version of the Delphi technique which 
is a method for obtaining a consensus of expert opinion about an issue or 
a problem not subject to precise quantification. For a description of 
this technique see Olaf Helmer, "Social Technology", New York, 1966, For 
-a briefer description see Olaf Helmer and Nicolas Rescher, "On the 
Espitemology of the Inexact Sciences", Management Science, Vol, VI, N° 1, 
October 1959, For an adaptation of the technique to the use of experts 
see Norman Dalkey and Olaf Helmer, "An Experimental Application of the 





hostile rather than supportive environment; (5) to their high vulnerability 
to loss of autonomy; (6) to their ineffective management practices; and (7) 
to their propensity to defensive behaviour vis-a-vis the pressures of the 
situation and in their dealing with superior authority, 
26, Forces pertaining to supervising authorities refer particularly to: 
(1) faulty target-setting; (2) to inadequate trust in the operating manager; 
(3) to their behaviour in ways that erode the autonomy of the enterprise; 
(4) to the ambiguous and conflicting yardsticks and criteria they maintain; 
(5) to their tendency to devalue the role and contribution of the enterprise 
manager; (6) to their low commitment to economic performance and their 
overconcern with performance-impeding non-economic goals; (7) to their 
incapability to direct, and to appreciate the problems of the operating man; 
(8) to their frequent preoccupation with small mistakes, petty errors and rule 
infractions, and (9) their ready tendency to scapegoating by shifting the blame 
to the operating manager. 
27, Forces pertaining to relationships between enterprise and its superior 
authority bring out the overlap, or rather interaction, between forces grouped 
in I and II, For the behaviour of the operating manager vis-a-vis authority 
is largely conditioned by the behaviour of authority toward him. They refer to 
the frequency of tensions, misunderstandings, differences, conflicts and the 
low level of mutual trust that often obtains between operating managers and 
their superior agencies, They bring out the frequent failures of communication 
and interaction processes throughout the managerial hierarchy of the public 
enterprise system. 
28, These three sets of forces, I, II and III as listed above, overlapping 
and necessarily interconnected as they are, represent the human side of public 
enterprise. At the risk of some oversimplification, they seem to account for 
two-thirds of the problem of public enterprise performance, or that much of 
the forces that emerge from the data as impeding performance; and apparently 
a bigger share of the forces that could be impelling performance. Yet more 
focus is usually placed on the "objective", material or the non-behavioural 




Initial Structural Handicaps 
29» The likelihood is high thnt a new public enterprise comes into existence, 
with an initial structural handicap or a. starting disadvantage. Indeed, 
most public enterprises observed emerge from their formative stage, as 
investment projects, into their operational stsge saddled with some structural 
handicap or disadvantage which continues to net as h drag on their cost 
performance for a protracted, period of time. This particularly shows in 
the cases of low performance, who are almost invariably beset by them, 
Hindustan Shipyard Ltd, (HSL), for example, has a cost structure which 
stands at no less higher than 40 per cent of competitive international 
prices. This unfavorable cost structure could be attributed to dependence 
on imported materials which constitute about 20 per cent of material costj 
to inadequate technical skills; to unutilized capacity and the low 
productivity potential of the shipyard. But this is lesser of a handicap 
than in the other cases of low-performers observed, 
30, In a cross-country sample of 50 new public enterprises the frequencies 
with which these initial structural disadvantages occur were found to be 
revealing of the following pattern, as presents in Table 2 below: 
Table 2 
FREQUENCES AND TYPES OF STRUCTURAL HANDICAPS 
Structural Handicap Frequency or percent e . of cases 
Ideational disadvantage 15 
Irregular Supply of material inputs 30 
Higher Capital Costs than anticipated 25 
Additional Overheads incurred in a protracted 
period of project implementation 20 
Deficient Form of Organization 5 
Inadequate Constitution of Board 20 
Technological Obsolescence 5 
Manpower redundancy 25 
Inadequate Market 15 
Faulty Product Line 15 
Other reasons 10 
/Most enterprises 
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Most enterprises were found to suffer from a .multi-dimensions 1 handicap, 
attributed to more than one reason. 
31» Locational disadvantages associate with a certain tendency to 
politicise the siting decision, or to overemphasise the role of public 
enterprise in regional development, particularly in case of projects which 
are not necessarily foot-loose, High dependence on foreign exchange 
allotments for effective operation renders the enterprise vulnerable to 
highly uncertain situational pressures and constraints. An enterprise 
with high import requirements in a situation of foreign exchange shortage 
is bound to be something of a "misfit". The demands of its production 
system rum counter to be critical constraints of the situation so much 
that the fit between these two interlocking arrangements is rendered 
highly precarious. Enterprise management operates under constant pressure 
to accomodate the imperatives of its production system to the critical 
constraint in the situation, 
32, High capital costs than anticipated and additional overhead incurred 
in protracted implementation are common-place enough to point, among other 
things, to inadequate motivation for economizing capital requirements. 
Inappropriate organizational forms, however, do not seem to loom as large 
as is usually supposed. For one thing, considerable diversity of performance 
obtains in enterprises with the same legal form of organization. Also wide 
differences in performance results could be found in enterprises with 
formal similarities in board constitution and tenure. It is the "quality" 
of the board rather than its "structure" that seems to really count. This 
casts doubt on the validity of "impersonal" rules about board constitution 
that have crept into practice in several situations. In any event, the 
structural characteristics of public enterprise organization could, whenever 
inappropriate in terms of the fit with the demands of the production system, 
operate as an impediment to performance. Less likely is that they could 
impel better performance, event where the fit between the technical and 
organizational systems is perfect. 
33. Manpower redundancy is not only a frequent occurrence, even among the 
starters, but also has a way of persisting. In many situations, it has 
proved highly difficult to flush out even in cases where rationalization has 
/been attested 
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been attempted. In general, such a handicap tends to compound any.other 
initial handicaps, a public enterprise started off with. At times, it 
could build into the enterprise a strong motivation for expansion with a 
view to productively utilize any redundant manpower the enterprise winded 
up with. It could induce a greater selectivity and scrutiny in tackling 
new recruitment. It could induce better within the enterprise retraining 
efforts. .And it could enhance the willingness of operating management, . 
to stand up to mounting pressures for "making" work. Operating managers, 
for example, who have seriously attempted rationalization schemes and 
enhanced the awareness of their superior authorities of the magnitude 
of redundancy they already carry, were found in a better position to resist 
pressures for absorbing more. But these are only indicative of the 
responses of the high performers to the pressures of the situation. By 
and large, however, an overcrowded organization tends to develop an 
organizational climate which is highly inimical to effective performance. 
34c Technological obsolescence is a greater source of handicaps to. 
public enterprises than it shows from present information. At least, it 
is potentially so. It is less visible or delayed a risk on account of . 
the low exposure to international competition. But its potential magnitude, 
for many a presently protected enterprise, can be gleaned from looking 
at the problems of performsce in national airlines operating in the 
international field. A tie-in or a partnership with advanced international 
companies has proved crucial for the effective operation of Royal Air 
Ma roc (R.A.M.), the Ethiopian Airlines and several other.cases. The more 
public enterprises step out into the international arena, vdth a view to 
promote experts for their national economies or to mop up an overflowing 
capacity, the more they will get exposed to the impediment of technological 
obsolescence. The "Airlines Pattern" could be a forerunner of the way 
public enterprises in many branches would have to adjust to the reality 
of mounting international competition. The same mechanisms of operating 
in a sheltered market, where foreign exchange shortage presents both 
an opportunity and a handicap, work to suspend the need for effective 
marketing and to make tolerable some initial marketing handicap, 
/Critical Constraints 
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Critical Constraint3 
35. Compounding or, at times cushioning these initial handicaps, moreover, 
are certain critical constraints that inhere in the enterprise situation. 
The situation is, of course, ripe with many critical constraints. And 
any public enterprise observed necessarily forms part of a complex larger 
system that places manifold constraints on the choices open to operating 
management. These constraints may work for better or for worse enterprise 
performance. That depends on the dominant behaviour patterns that emerge 
in response to a particular set of constraints» The foreign exchange 
constraint, which has received the highest frequency in the responses* 
could impede the regularity of material flow presupposed by a continuous 
production system; could increase the risk of excess capacities and cotild 
render the profit performance of the enterprise highly vulnerable to 
environmental constraints. But it could simultaneously reduce the risk of 
foreign competition, enhance the implicit monopoly power of the enterprise 
and create opportunities for material savings and import substitutions«, 
Such a constraint, equally critical for two enterprises, could prove an 
insurmountable impediment to one; a manageable difficulty or even an 
inducement mechanism of a sort to the other. The problem does not seem 
to reside in the constraints per se, manifold and critical as they are, 
inasmuch as in the managers1 perceptions of them and in the resultant 
responses. 
36. The managers' responses to some of these most critical constraints, 
including the foreign exchange constraint, were elicited in a series of 
workshops conducted in three of the countries covered, involving about 
150 public enterprise managers. The responses to the foreign exchange, 
constraint were found to range all the way from "complaining about it", 
to various practices of "cushioning" against this ever-present risk by 
"hiding" reserves of critical items; over-estimating requirements; to 
various practices of improvisation that, at times, border on a "creative" 
response to the problem. This exercise has brought to the fore the newer 
skills that managers have to develop, call them "improvisation" skills 
if you will, in order to compensate or "over-compensate" for the missing, 
components and for meeting the risk of ever-present critical constraints. 
/Such skills 
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Such skills point to his ability to gain access to certain decision centers; 
to engage effectively in a "bureaucratic", as opposed to »market", 
competition for the allocation of scarce resources; to pursue informal 
practices of collaboration with other enterprise managers in coping with 
a common problem; to evolve positive arrangements for economizing foreign 
exchange requirements; and capabilities of "aggresive" acquisition of these 
resources from new sources e,g, effective arrangements with foreign 
supplies. Undoubtedly,, this constraint, like several others, seems to be 
taxing to his abilities. But there are always the "few" who seem to 
be coping with it more effectively. 
37« Next to the foreign exchange constraint, in terms of the frequency 
of responses, is the multiplicity of "restrictivê 1 administrative rules, 
emanating from the practices.of the established bureaucracy, which are 
often pressed on the operating managers, of public enterprises. This is 
a greater and more pronounced a tendency in public enterprise systems 
which make for lesser differentiation from than integration with the 
traditions of established administration. In some systems, the public 
enterprise is more pegged to private company practices than others. In 
others, it is, more or less, a satellite of the departmental form, and 
a "prisoner " of its mode of operation. But the risk is always there for 
public enterprise managers to be called upon to "import" the administrative 
rules and practices of their larger administrative system. Here again, 
however, field evidence seems to suggest that the problem of performance 
vis-̂ i-vis these rules, resides less in the rules than in the enterprise 
managers' responses to them. The information generated through the 
workshop experiences, referred to above, clearly indicates that the attitudes 
of operating managers toward these rules range all the way from those who 
look upon it as "divinely ordained";^/ to those who look upon them as 
virtually" negotiable to those, who in varying degrees and for varied, 
motives, are willing to take the risk of rule-infraction. By and large, 
those who have positive and visible performance results to show, have a 
higher propensity, to take the risk of rule-infraction than otherwise. Those 





who look upon the rules as divinely ordained stop short at complaining about 
them, as they do about the foreign exchange shortage and other 
constraints. 
38, This, again, brings to the fore the newer skills that are prompted 
by the environmental constraints. The effective operating manager can be 
usefully construed as engaging in perpetual negotiations with authorities 
over changing rules, with a view to increase the "fit" between these 
rules and the demands of his production system. Those operating managers 
who exhibit a high achievement motivation, but fail to develop adequately 
this rule-negotiating skills, have only to fall back on their attitude 
to the risk of rule-infraction. From among those, there could be a 
significant "fall-out". And it has proved highly significant in some 
situations to investigate such a fall-out - those operating managers who 
were driven out of the public enterprise system either of their own valition 
or out of their frustrations or because they were forced out. From the 
meager evidence that is available they largely appear to be non-conformers 
who either failed to develop the negotiating skill described above or to 
show rather "dramatic" or spectacular results. But the dead weight of 
these rules and bureaucratic constraints could be such that they protect 
the conformist or winnow out of a given stock of operating managers for 
successful survivers, 
39, Next to bureaucratic constraints, in the rank order of the responses, 
are the restrictions imposed upon the action possibilities of operating 
managers on account of certain missing components of skilled, professional . 
and sub-professional manpower - management accountants, production engineers,-
management staff specialists of all types and effective supervisory personnel. 
3h a way, the frequency of these missing manpower components reflect the 
physical fact that it takes some fifteen years to develop most of these 
professional-technical skills, while it takes five years or so.to construct 
the production facilities. Inherent in the process, therefore, is a manpower 
development lag. This is frequently confounded by the constraints on the 
employment of expatriate manpower in conjunction with the foreign exchange 
constraint. For, in principle at least, such a constraint could be eliminated 
or reduced by shifting the supply to encompass the reservoir of importable 
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manpower from.advanced countries. But these constraints have their way of 
inter-locking, inter-connecting and building upon each other so that they 
often call for the solution of a simultaneous equation. And this seems 
to.be an obvious example, 
40» In any event, these missing manpower components are readily dec ta ble 
from an examination of the manpower structure of public enterprises. What 
readily emerges is a serious gap at the middle and upper middle levels of 
the management structure, and a total void or a semblance of presence of staff 
management specialists. The public enterprise manager emerges from the 
empirical information more as a lone operator, a one-man management team and a 
field commander with no staff than his counterpart in the modern corporation is 
ordinarily.depicted. He might frecuently labour under a top-heavy, 
over-sized, "controlB-type board, while missing the supportive role of 
an adequate "executive" and "staff" management team. Typically¿ he has 
a tough manpower development job on his hand, and, in a way, he has to 
lift up his organization by some "operation bootstrap". To turn out to 
the educational system and its appendages to find the support, he is 
usually frustrated by the lack of "match with the requirements". To turn 
outward to the internacional labour market is virtually rules out. To 
turn outward to the domestic market, he typically finds himself in intense 
competition with a plethora of enterprises and bureaucratic agencies. 
The competition is particularly intense where it draws in his counterparts 
in a dynamic private sector, in command of greater degrees of freedom 
that he is not in command of; or relatively free from constraints he is 
not free from. Falling back on a prescribed salary scale and a 
multiplicity of personnel rules circumscribing his freedoms, he often 
feels disarmed and lacking any competitive edge, 
41. All the pressures of his situation and the interlocking constraints 
behooves him to "look inward" rather than outward; to do it himself and 
to "do it otherwise". Here, again, in response to the situation, the 
high performers and the performers get differentiated. The high-performer 
falls back on his negotiating skill with authority to acquire a critically 
needed skill from abroad; to acquire a greater degree of freedom in employing 
expatriates; and to relax restrictions on the terms he could offer to attract 
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and retain the best. He falls back on his improvisation skills by-
resorting to aggresive recruitment; to even manpower "piracy"; by inventing 
new inducements to attract and retain scarce manpower» By activating 
within-the-enterprise manpower development and by "discovering" the right 
combination of measures, he could surmount the constraint. This is 
evident from a number of cases in the UAR of public enterprises labouring 
under the same set. of constraints; yet the high-performers among them 
managed to acquire, develop and retain a reservoir of scarce skills, 
while the low performers stand not really short of good alibis. 
42. Ideological or political constraints seem to gain a paramount weight 
under some systems; at least more than others. They could have precedence 
over the imperatives and dictates of economic, management and, at times, 
technical rationality. They could creep into the public enterprise management 
process so that it gets highly politicized, consistently according precedence 
to political demands and imperatives whenever they are in conflict, frequently 
as they are found to be, with the imperatives and demands of economic 
performance. A degree of politicization of the management process of public 
enterprise, in this sense, seems inevitable in most systems, unless 
supervising authorities, as seldom happens, opt for the posture of the 
"ordinary" investor as in some mixed enterprises. The differences are 
more of degree than of kind. A strong egalitarian policy orientation, as 
in Tanzania; or a welfare orientation as in Ceylon; or control-pcwer 
orientation as in the U.A.R.; or even a civil service orientation of a 
Post-office socialism variety as in India,could render vulnerable the 
management process in public enterprises to extra-performance political 
and ideological constraints. 
43* The picture of operating manager that emerges again from the empirical 
information is one of coping with a perpetual struggle between the demands 
of economic performance and a host of ideological and political constraints. 
An egalitarian orientation could impose the constraint of reducing the gap 
between high-skilled salaries and low-skilled wages which is generally 
wider in developing countries. To operate against the law of supply and 
14/ As noted by J.K. Galbraith and by Prof. Edward Mason as well as others 
and publicized by the Press in terms of a stereotype of a Fabian 
Bureaucrat, see for example, Edward Ifeson, op, cit, p. 5» 
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and demand, could result in loss of skills or manpower drain in a competitive 
situation. Worse still is that it could lead to no serious turnover but 
to more serious demoralization, suppress«! frustrations and subtle forms 
of apathy or sabotage. In the same vein, a formal or informal constraint 
by the way of appeasing strike-prone unions could undermine discipline, 
melt away management authority and get the labour situation out of operating 
managorient control. Directed to enforce a promulgate workers1 participation 
system out of some political motivation, or for gaining control, could, 
where the preconditions of effective participation are absent, only result 
in diluting management authority and enhance intraorganizational political 
bargaining. And so on.^^ 
44. The options presented to the operating manager in this situation 
could be either: to "fight" which could be suicidal for many; to 
"flight" where there could be no alternative for the many; or to "compromise". 
That is why the image of the operating manager that seems to be emerging 
from field investigation is one of a compromiser between the conflicting 
dictates of the political process and the imperatives of economic performance. 
The public enterprise, in particular, stands as a constant testing ground 
of this compromising skill on the part of the operating manager. The 
high performer, and for that matter the surviver in many a public enterprise 
system, is the one who reasonably "manages" to meet and/or appease such 
political or ideological demands, without having to trade away too much of 
the economic performance results he needs eventually to show. But here, 
again, the tensions between the two conflicting desiderata could be so 
severe and so fundamental that only few or very few come on on top of 
their situation. In many subtle ways, the system seems, to function in 
15/ In some centrally-planned systems extolling the virtue of manual labour, 
setting the manager to sweep the factory floor; and the inspiring'value 
of doctrine leading to more time out for political indoctrination, could 




such a way that it snakes only for the survival of the "dual executive^^ 
- the one who combines the skills of the "rational manager»^^ with the 
skills of the political operator, 
45» Last but, at times, not least, would some come the so-called cultural 
constraints. Situations, of course, abound whence public enterprise 
performance is severely bound by certain cultural constraints. Most notable, 
among these, as far as the empirical data goes, are the ethnic group 
tensions and conflicts that afflict public enterprise operations in many 
situations. The Nigerian Railways, is a case in point. But this severe 
dilemma for the operating manager, particularly in public enterprise to 
the extent of political sensitivity expected of him, has cropped up, time 
and again, in several contexts,^/ Here, again, not only the whole 
constellation of comproiidsing-negotiatlng-improvising skills commanded 
by the operating manager is put to a severe test»^^ But his national 
identity, emotional maturity, his capability to cross ethnic barriers, to 
understand inter-group dynamics, to build integrated teams and to practise 
effective human relations, are being constantly exposed. 
16/ For a recent attempt at depicting this emerging "dual executive«" in 
the Soviet system, see George Fischer, The Soviet System and Modern 
Society, (New York: Atherton Press, 196871 
17/ For the contrasting picture of the rational manager see Charles H, Kepner 
and Benjamin B. Tregoe, The Rational. Manager, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1965). No reference to the situational constraints is made in 
describing the rational manager's problem-solving approach, 
18/ It has repeatedly cropped up in the Expert Meeting sponsored by the 
ILO on Social and Cultural Factors on Management Development in 1965, 
It has also cropped up in the Expert Meeting sponsored by the ILO 
on Management Development in Africa, For both meetings the author has 
served as consultant. And several field experiences in Africa and the 
Far East have severely brought it out, 
19/ It is to be noted, however, that such cultural constraints tend to be 
overrated by outside observers who are apt, consciously or unconsciously 
to intrude their values and their self-reference criterion into a 
different cultural situation,- But the Japanese industrialization 
experience stands out to show the great possibilities of reconcilability 
between certain non-Western or, at times, non-rational cultural 
traits and the imperatives of an industrial production system̂ . See, 
for example, the significant case study by James C. Abegglen on "The 
Japanese Factory", Aspects of its Social Organization, Free Press, 
Illinois, 1958, See also an unpublished manuscript of his on "Japanese 
Business Leaders", dated 1962, 
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The Strategic Significance of Operating Managers Responses 
46. It is not then, that these public enterprises, observed are, more often 
than not, ridden with fundamental or structural problems, handicapped by-
organizational weaknesses and subjected to high pressures and critical 
constraints. For these are.more or less common experiences for the high 
and low performers alike. What seems to spell out the difference, in 
terms of performance results, is the response to these pressures and the 
enterprise behaviour in coping with these problems and handicaps. Available 
evidence, at some risk of simplification, points to a pattern of behaviour 
that associates with high performance and a different pattern that associates 
with low performance as schematically presented in Exhibit II below.. 
Performance results as they unfold influence further this pattern of behaviour. 
And they also shape the organizational relations between the enterprise and 
supervising authorities in ways that influence further a particular behaviour. 
And so on. 
Exhibit II 
SCHEMATIC PRESENTATION OF VARYING RESPONSES 
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47® For example, a comparison between two high-performers and three 
comparable low-performers in the textile industry of one country covered 
20/ 
reveals roughly the following array of events.— Through their relative 
freedom from initial handicaps and their way of responding to the pressures 
of a new situation, high-performers have managed to accelerate production 
to overtake employment demands and to increase productivity to keep pace 
with labour's demands. In contract, low-performers have got at some point, 
caught in a fatal profit squeeze. The attendant dependency on external 
support and subsidization has set in motion a train of events threatening 
their autonomy and increasing their vulnerability to these external pressures. 
The contrasting sequences can be, at the risk of some oversimplification, 
schematically presented as in Exhibit III A and B below. 
48. , The most significant conclusion that emerges from the analysis of 
differential performance at the level of individual enterprises, is the 
contrasting behavioural differences that obtain between high-performers and 
low-performers. High-performers have been found to display different 
motivations, attitudes, practices, and patterns of responses as compared 
with those displayed by low-performers. These varying sets of "casual 
variables" appear to be the correlates of effective and ineffective 
performance. Available evidence points particularly to the quality of 
management leadership, at the operating level as a correlate of enterprise 
performance. Different leadership patterns at the enterprise level 
including individual differences in managerial competence, in the need for 21/ achievement stand out as particularly significant.—• 
20/ Based on an unpublished comparative case study of Beida Dyers, 
Kafa el Dawar, Filature Nationale, ifelwan Textiles and Kena Spinning 
and Weaving - all belonging to the public enterprise sector in 
the U.A.R. 
21/ The Final Report of Geneva Seminar captured as consensus of country 
participants as it stated: "again, it has become even more clear than it 
was at Rangoon and New Delhi that the precise -legal forms of public 
enterprises are of small importance in comparison to the personal 
qualities laid professional qualifications of managerial personnel. 
In fact, it is now obvious that managerial recruitment and development 
are.the key problems of public enterprise in all countries". See report 
of the United Nations Seminar on Organization and Administration of 
Public Enterprises, Sales No. 67.II.H.2, p. 2. 
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Exhibit III A 
A SIMPLE REPRESENTATION OF THE SEQUENCES OBTAINING 
IN CASES OF HIGH-PERFORMANCE 
Exhibit III B 
A SIMPLE REPRESENTATION OF THE SEQUENCES 
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49» Experiential evidence suggests that, no matter what might be the facts 
of a specific situation, the key variable that associates with these 
comparative differences in performance, seems to be the personality of the 
public enterprise manager concerned and his response to the pressures of 
the situation under which he operates. Indeed, the new roles demanded 
of public enterprise managers in the national development effort, call for 
new personality types possessing the entrepreneurial traits of the 
transitional or innovational personality. In a real sense, they call for 
a new breed of so-called "public entrepreneurs". Even in highly traditional 
societies where the authoritarian personality is said to prevail, there is 
present within the universe of public enterprise managers, innovational 
personality types. In many developing countries, early family training, 
formal schooling, higher education training, early and advanced work 
experiences seem to work for the formation and reinforcement of 
authoritarian bureaucratic personalities, placing a great valuation upon 
conformity. The approval motive tends to be stronger than achievement 
motivation. But this kind of analysis, realistic as it might seem in 
terms of experiential evidence, should not lead to a no-action prescription. 
For public enterprise managers are mostly recruited from elite groups, with 
"cosmopolitan" value systems, where the frequency of new personality types 
is higher and their ability to assimilate new attitudes, values and 
motivations cannot be underestimated. 
50. It has proved almost impossible to account for deficient performance 
in the "lows" in isolation from the operating managers, responses to 
environmental pressures under which they operate. It has proved highly 
revealing to get a feel for the manifold pressures under which these 
managers are placed in order to perform according to the targets and 
dictates of the national plan or policies. To gain a better understanding 
of public enterprise performance, supervising authorities need to understand 
the role conflicts to which they are subjected, the deliberate pressures 
imposed upon them through statutory measures, ministerial discretions, 
the multiple controls - direct and indirect - they have to cope with; the ever-
present shortages, bottlenecks and uncertainties they have to deal with and 
the help, if any, they are getting from external agencies. It has proved 
also to be revealing to consider the morale of senior management personnel 
/in public 
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in public enterprises, to search for whatever adverse factors are operating 
on their motivation and for how adequately the system provides for nurturing 
their morale and for conducing to their growth as effective managers. 
Indeed, the forces operating for "public enterprise growth" seem to highly 
overlap with the forces conducive to the growth of public enterprise 
managers. 
Contrasting Responses 
51. Placed under a high-pressure system, there are always those operating 
managers who evolve and perfect their own bureaucratic defense mechanisms 
in response to the situation. But there are also those who do respond 
creatively enough to make significant developmental contributions. 
Consequently, an adequate analysis of the performance record, has called 
for a systematic detection of the varying pattern of responses that 
operating managers exhibit and for assessing their developmental implications. 
For. certain patterns of behaviour can be ascertained to conduce to, while 
others could defeat adequate performance results. 
52. The pressures, as observed, are largely working simultaneously in 
several conflicting directions: (i) to maximize capacity utilization, 
employment absorption, and gross production; while attaining a break-even 
point or a profit target no less than last year; and while coping with 
a perennial exchange shortage; (ii) a cost-push tendency is combining with 
a sticky price structure or inflexibly administered prices or downward 
pressure upon prices to result in a profit squeeze; (iii) to produce 
performance results while demonstrating his sensitivity to political and 
ideological demand; (iv) to produce such results while caught in a cross-fire 
between the demands for high ̂ differentiation" from, and the conflicting 
demands of high "integration" with the established administration. And so on. 
53. 3b operating managers, these manifold pressures generate threats, 
challenges, anxieties, frustrations conflicts and fears of failure. 
Generally speaking, there are two main patterns of response to these 
pressures. One is to change behaviour So that it becomes congruent with 
these performance expectations. The second is rather a defensive reaction 
that can be, as observed, manifested in innumerable ways and manifestations. 
A really rich variety is available to the field observer. It could take 
the form of, more often covert than overt, aggression vis-à-vis authority. 
/More likely, 
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More likely, it leads to repression of dilemmas, suppression of informal 
practices; denial, inhibition and quick, ready rationalizations. It could 
lead to a ready tendency to "externalize", problems and project than on 
other parties. It could induce overcompensation by excessive identification 
with the political line and marked ambivalence to performance. It could 
lead to "continuation" or vacillation or even flight-physical or psychological. 
Seldom does the operating man lack an alibi. But such defensiveness is a 
ready and easy substitute for problem-solving. 
54» Almost invariably, low-performers exhibit more of such defensive 
behaviour than high-performers. Low-performers have proved to be more 
frequently inhibited by the restrictions on their formal administrative 
authority; while high-performers were aware of their "informal* power 
enough to determine the outcome in many situations of interaction with 
superior agencies. 3h their dealings with these agencies, high-performer3 
have experientially learned the power of "knowing" about their jobs more than 
anybody else, the power of competence; the power of initiating 
well-conceived decisions and accurately anticipating performance outcomes. 
Low-performers have shown a tendency to take the stance of recipients of 
directives; they more frequently refer problems to higher authorities 
for instructions without initiating a defensible solution. By all accounts, 
they display a greater sense of impotence and they readily resort to 
psychological abdication. Their response to deteriorating performance, 
for reasons often perceived to be beyond their control, is frequently 
a sense of incompetence, inadequacy, loss of control, helplessness and 
abdication. It could also generate a tendency to overcompensate by 
eliciting foreign help and government protection. 
55* By contrast, the high-porformers appear to nearly meet both the 
requirements for highly differentiated organizational units and the 
necessity for these units to work well with the corresponding government 
departments. They readily cope with their ever-present role conflicts, 
and appear to gain a greater capability for reconciling the enterprise 
goals with the public policy goals. Positive performance results provide 
a greater latitude for this reconciliation. Low-performers on the other 
hand get to drift more frequently into organizational conflicts with 
/authority, with 
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authority, with economic overtones. Relatively, the enterprise is often 
weak and the supervising authority is strong; and unresolved issues with 
authority are likely to induce fall-outs. 
Influence System Characteristics 
56. Certain features of the public enterprise management system, at a macro-
level, seem to operate in such a way as to conduce to, or more probably 
to reinforce effective and ineffective performance. As emerging from 
available responses, they pertain particularly to: (l) the inconclusiveness 
of measuring performance; (2) the uncertainties involved in evaluating 
performance by a remote or unsympathetic superior authority; (3) the 
vertical diffusion of authority throughout the hierarchy to make a 
scapegoating a ready mechanism - both ways; (4) the horizontal diffusion 
of management authority through prescribed rules for workers participation 
or for certain inter-enterprise relations; (5) the perennial ambiguity 
of rules; (6) the strength of forces operating to erode enterprise autonony 
in many situations; (7) and the inadequacy of impelling forces or "energy 
inputs" received from the larger system. 
57» Exposure of operating management to some continuous evaluation feedback 
could be a powerful impelling force to effective performance. This is 
particularly evident in public enterprises like Port Authorities and 
national airlines operating internationally, serving not only domestic 
users but also foreign shippers and clients. Therefore their performance 
is continuously subject to the critical review of users who are familiar 
with comparative performance in neighbouring countries as well as in 
advanced economies. International performance standards are readily 
brought to bear on users» evaluation. And such evaluation feedback is 
effected spontaneously in the course of operating rather than being 
predicated on some external bureaucratic assessment. But this serves 
only to illustrate the inadequacy of feedback mechanisms found in most 
cases. And when few enterprises happen to be subjected to such exceptionally 
strong evaluation feedback, effective management response is not adequately 
reinforced. 
/58« In 
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58« In looking at the performance of a public enterprise in particular, 
supervising authorities have to appreciate the fact that they are dealing 
with open systems. More so than in the case of private enterprise or 
foreign enterprises. The more open systems import, willingly or unwillingly, 
a considerable lot of impelling as well as impeding forces from their larger 
systems and their environments. In effect, the enterprise truly becomes 
a microcosm of that larger system. But public enterprises are open 
systems in varying degrees and for different reasons. Some of these 
might pertain to the structural characteristics of the enterprise. 
For example, the technology of operations in the Karachi Port Trust, as 
in Colombo, still largely manual and entailing a work force of more than 
10,000 employees, does not insulate the port from the influence of 
traditional cultural factors to the extent that the technology of Pakistan 
International Airlines does for that enterprise. A higher level of technology, 
higher capital intensity, a smaller and a highly skilled workforce work in 
certain ways to insulate the enterprise, in some degree, from its large 
culture. Its organizational cult tire tends, in certain respects at least, 
to be differentiated from its larger culture. 
In Conclusion 
59» Looking at the whole array of events and the sequence of enterprise 
behaviour through time, the analyst is apt to experience some difficulties 
in disentangling the causes of effective performance from its consequences. 
So is the problem in analyzing cases of ineffective performance. In either 
case, one gets the impression of observing a cumulative process where causes 
and consequences inter-lock and are often self-sustaining and mutually 
reinforcing. The movement of the high-performers through time seems to 
approximate a model of an "ascending spiral" of accelerated growth. 
By contrast, the low-performers seem to be locked into a descending spiral 
of deteriorating performance. Very few low-performers seem to be locked 
into a closed circle of no-growth and no-deterioration. These contrasting 
performance models seem to suggest that enterprises which fail, for whatever 
causes, to break through some initial phase of infancy and teething troubles 
into an ascending spiral, tend to get enveloped into a descending path 
/of deteriorating 
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of deteriorating performance. In most cases observed, it is either an 
ascending or a descending spiral; an acceleration or deceleration process. 
It does not seem to look as a closed circle. 
60. These contrasting growth paths are clearly illustrated by Hindustan 
Insecticides Ltd. (HIL) when juxtaposed with Hindustan Shipyard Ltd. (HSL). 
Signs of the deteriorating performance of HSL can be gleaned from the 
increasing shortfall in output results and the elongation of the average 
construction period for a vessel. A target of 60,000 DWT per year was 
envisaged originally by 1963-64; hut it was progressively scaled down to 
40,000 DWT by the end of the third plan. The DWT achieved usually fell 
short of the DWT scheduled in most years. During the second plan period 
the proportion fell as low as 34 per cent in 1960-61, and in the third plan 
period to 55 per cent in 1964-65. The average construction period for a 
vessel seems to have increased greatly as time passed. During 1955-61 it 
stood between 21 months and 30 months, whereas during 1964-66 it varied 
between 34 months and 44 months. Contrasting signs of perceptible 
improvement in performance were readily exhibited by HIL. lower costs, 
improved prices, expanding market, better financial result, less need for 
dependence on authorities, more autonomy, greater expansion, better wages, 
more peaceful industrial relations and a confirmed image of success. 
61. The same pattern, in varying degrees and varying details, repeats 
itself in many diverse situations. In comparing Mbhatam Press Company (MPC) 
or Transport Engineering Company (TEC) with Plywoods Processing Corporation 
(PPC), all belonging to the Chemical "Holding" Organization in the UAR -
the same pattern obtains. In comparing Royal Air Maroc (RAM) with Office 
National d'Irrigation (ONI), both operating under largely the same management 
system in Morocco, the same pattern crops up. In comparing the Yildiz 
Porcelain Factory (YPF) with the Siimerbank Leather and Shoe Factory, both 
belonging to Siimerbank of Turkey, it is the same. Even in comparing 
El Hospital Uhiversitario with EJGULA in Colombo, it is again the same 
pattern. 
62. Even when it comes to relations with superior authorities, high-:.' 
performers tend to be in a better position to command government due 
support and to ward off undue interventions than low-performers. Thus HSL 
experienced serious delay in mobilizing needed consultancy help partly 
/because of 
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because of the government's unwillingness to release the foreign exchange. 
Royal Air Maroc (RAM) managed to command reasonable management support 
without undue interference to establish prestigious lines. By contrast, 
"artificial® government support, when forthcoming to the lower-performers 
who need it most, might not conduce to their effective management behaviour. 
This is illustrated by the experience of HSL. The fewness and discontinuity 
of shiporders in the early years inevitably kept management from experiencing 
a keen concern for production planning and economical operations. When 
orders flowed in later, through artificial government support, management 
felt, consciously or unconsciously, assured of a "captive" market. And the 
pricing formula kept the management from experiencing a need for keenly 
searching for cus toners., cost economies on efficient production planning. 
Thus certain interventions by supervising authorities might relieve 
management from the need for particular growth experiences. 


